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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Planning and the Interagency Process

How can the United States Department of Defense and the Department of State prepare for future joint operations in a time of reduced budgets?

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Preface

The issue of the interagency process has been one highlighted at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College since I started the program in 2011. Throughout classes, problems and deficiencies with both the armed services and civilian government organizations, particularly the State Department, were highlighted. The topic quickly became my hot button issue and I often contemplated ways to fix the problems, usually in the area of planning.

The research available on the challenges of the interagency process is extensive. I found many professionals eager to provide their take on the problems and the way forward. It is a profound topic within the professional education schools of the military and government. It was quickly highlighted to me through personal conversations and written research that the interagency process is both the military's and the civilian agencies' responsibility and should be addressed as such.

I would like to thank Dr. Craig Swanson for his mentorship of this thesis. His expertise in American foreign policy and international relations provided me the specialized guidance for the formulation and content of my writings. I would like to acknowledge Colonel John Fitzpatrick for his detailed knowledge and teachings of the Marine Corps Planning Process. Of particular note is conference group 2, who welcomed me into the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and into the military culture.

Executive Summary

Title: Planning and the Interagency Process

Author: Special Agent Joshua Yerace, U.S. Department of State

Thesis: How can the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State prepare for joint operations in a time of reduced budgets?

Discussion: Throughout history, examples of the successes and failures of the interagency process abound. With the global financial crisis striking the United States, it is imperative for the United States Department of Defense and the Department of State to coordinate their activities through a streamlined approach to the interagency process. A focus on the operational level of planning at the State Department and an exchange of military and foreign service officers for advising and ensuring all assets of national power are employed during military combat operations and crisis intervention is required.

Conclusion: The State Department lacks a focus on the operational level of planning which often creates redundancy in its strategic policy goals. It is a necessity for the State Department to develop a planning process while ensuring it takes the lead role in the interagency process.

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Introduction

The Department of Defense and the Department of State are the two entities through which the United States government employs its foreign policy. Through diplomatic and military intervention, these two arms of the government attempt to extend the United States' reach overseas. It is vital for the Department of Defense and the Department of State to work in concert with one another for the furtherance of United States foreign policy. Due to the expeditionary foundation of the United States Marine Corps, it forged a strong inter working relationship with the State Department, both domestically and overseas. Therefore, the Marine Corps will often be the focus of context within this document. This paper will examine the history of the interagency process between the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State, analyze the planning processes of both the United States Marine Corps and the Department of State, and provide recommendations for improving the ability for enhanced cooperation in responding to today's crisis situations.

Today, the United States government like many other countries is facing a financial crisis that will severely impact its ability to continue at its current operating level. Budget cutbacks across the entire government will affect personnel, technology acquisition, and future mission size and sustainability. The United States will no longer be able to militarily intervene on the scale it has in the past. How can the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State prepare for joint operations in a time of reduced budgets? In order to meet the next challenges tomorrow's crises will pose, the United States Department of Defense and the Department of State must fully integrate their planning processes. Through a streamlined approach, the interagency process can achieve its goals on a limited budget.

Throughout the history of modern warfare, examples of interagency cooperation success and failure abound. From the post World War II occupation of Germany to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams of Iraq and Afghanistan, the relationships of the diplomats and the military have been tested. The road to a successful interagency process will have to meet the changing future of the military and political battlefields.

The future missions of today's military leaders and diplomats will most likely consist of small-scale military interventions utilizing a whole of government approach. The current enemy to global security is the small state or non-state actor, which poses a unique challenge to the United States. Therefore, success of a military operation alone will not resolve the conflict as easily as a traditional large-scale army on army war. The United States is beginning to understand the reasons for these types of small wars and how to counter the enemy insurgent through non-traditional military means. The non-traditional military operation is usually referred to as a counter-insurgency mission. An insurgency is defined as "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region."¹ By definition, an insurgency is predominantly a political issue, which must be dealt with through like-minded operations. This irregular warfare requires the military and the diplomats to plan and operate together, in order to counter act the effects, which cause the insurgents to rebel. With the budget constraints of today's government, the ability to throw more money at a protracted operation is not an option. The coordination between the Department of Defense and State Department is essential for the continuation of United States foreign policy in today's operating environments.

History

Many look back to post-World War II Germany as a shining example of how the occupation, reconstruction, and stabilization of a country should progress, even though political leaders in Washington made mistakes. Prior to and at the beginning of World War II, no cooperation between civilian and military leaders existed to plan for post World War II Germany. President Franklin D. Roosevelt often kept his Secretary of State out of the loop and stated, "I dislike making plans for a country we do not occupy."² As the war progressed, challenges between government agencies, particularly the Department of State, and the armed services led to the creation of the State War Navy Coordinating Committee in 1944. This committee allowed decisions to be coordinated at a higher level for the implementation of United States foreign policy throughout the rest of the war.³ Although planning for post-conflict operations did not exist at the beginning, the protracted years of fighting allowed time for detailed planning. However, the military handled the majority of governance work within Germany, relying on the State Department for mainly strategic guidance. This often proved useless due to the unrealistic goals set forth by diplomats not understanding the true situation on the ground.

During World War II, the State Department had a limited amount of personnel in country. Therefore, the military often took control of governmental concerns within occupied areas of Germany and left the strategic goals to the State Department back in Washington, D.C. Many Army officers were familiar with the operation of government institutions due to the formation of the School of Military Government in 1942.⁴ Although the school did not provide comprehensive training to military officers, it gave an exposure to the officer on running or observing how a government should operate. This was essential in post-World War II Germany

as many military officers took on the role of administering a government body within the Allied controlled areas. On the other hand, the State Department had no such training available which further relegated it to duties on the strategic level rather than the operational or tactical level.

In contrast to World War II, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was quick and decisive. The United States controlled most of the critical areas of Iraq within months. Unfortunately, the United States government did not learn from its actions in World War II, therefore the United States did not have a comprehensive plan for the country's reconstruction in place prior to its invasion. The Department of Defense under the leadership of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld became the dominating force due in part to President George W. Bush's actions. President Bush had given the authority of Iraq reconstruction to the Department of Defense via the National Security Presidential Directive 24.⁵ By giving the authority to the Department of Defense, the President effectively dislodged the State Department's ownership of Iraq and complicated the reconstruction and stabilization efforts of the interagency members. This was evident when Secretary Rumsfeld asked Jay Garner, Iraqi Coordinator for Reconstruction, to remove a former State Department employee from his staff and disregard State's post war plan titled, "The Future of Iraq" project.⁶

The Future of Iraq project began less than a month after the 9/11 attacks. The plan studied the needs for reconstruction post Saddam-Hussein in the following areas: public health and humanitarian needs, transparency and anti-corruption, oil and energy, defense policy and institutions, transitional justice, democratic principles and procedures, local government, civil society capacity building, education, free media, water, agriculture and environment and economy and infrastructure. The plan relied on over

two hundred Iraqis who participated in working groups to identify areas of concern and need in reconstruction efforts.⁷ Due to the weakened position of the State Department and the dominant personalities embedded in the Department of Defense, The Future of Iraq project never received the due attention it deserved.

Eventually the authority of reconstruction within Iraq was removed from the Department of Defense and given to the Department of State under National Security Presidential Directive 44 in December of 2005. This directive gave the State Department “the responsibility to manage interagency efforts to conduct reconstruction and stabilization.”⁸ With the authority of the executive office behind it, the State Department moved forward and began to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout Iraq. These teams combined both civilian and military power and coordinated the efforts of both entities to be mutually supporting. Most importantly they were staffed by both military and civilians, but led by a foreign-service officer from the State Department. In contrast to World War II, the State Department played a vital role on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and continues to this day in post conflict stabilization operations.

Both World War II and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provide examples of the lack of coordination of planning and use of resources between the Department of Defense and State. Even in two diverse battlefields as these, the coordinated planning for reconstruction and stabilization efforts was non-existent prior to the commencement of battle. Most often the resources the military has available dwarf that of the State Department. In World War II this led to the military assuming control during and after military operations. In Iraq, even though the State Department had formulated a

comprehensive list of projects and activities vital to the reconstruction, the Defense Department dominated the country and forced State to take a back seat for the first couple years. Once the President and other top lawmakers saw that a stable Iraq was far from attainable, vital changes allowed the State Department to implement a whole of government approach. The military provided the necessary security, while the diplomats and civilian agencies conducted positive reconstruction efforts. This allowed the State Department to oversee the operational and tactical level missions and quickly adjust their actions as needed. Both examples document the need for a coordinated planning process.

Planning

The hallmark of any successful military or civilian operation is the ability of its leaders to effectively plan across the spectrum government entities. The Marine Corps has excelled in the planning process and is a good example of how well a Department of Defense entity can prepare for missions at the operational level. The Marine Corps defines planning as “The art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about.”⁹ The Marine Corps Planning Process takes a top down approach, allowing planners the ability to take a strategic concept and develop an operational plan. This requires a Marine to critically think and question the strategic concept. The process allows the Marine to deliver an operationally sound product, yet is flexible for the tactical leader on the ground.

The Marine Corps utilizes a six-step process in order to understand the problem at hand and develop ways to solve it. These steps include: problem framing, course of action development, course of action war gaming, course of action comparison and

decision, orders development and transition.¹⁰ First, problem framing allows the planning team to gain a higher-level understanding of the environment and nature surrounding the problem. It includes intelligence products, intent and guidance from the commander, detailed analysis of the enemy and friendly forces, assumptions, and limitations of forces. Secondly, course of action development processes the information from problem framing and develops methods to solve the issue. It includes updated information from problem framing, one or more courses of action, and task organization. Next, course of action war-gaming examines and allows for the refinement of options based on actions and reactions of enemy and friendly forces. It allows planners to make changes to the course of action based on assumed results. Course of action comparison and decision allows the commander to decide which course of action is best suited to overall mission accomplishment. Then, orders development is devised a plan in order to be implemented by the commander's subordinates. Lastly, transition provides a detailed brief or several briefs to the various executors of the plan. This ensures that all levels of command fully understand the orders and plan that has been developed.¹¹

Each step in the planning process is detailed and encompasses three tenets: top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning.¹² These tenets are crucial for planning. They ensure the commander is not only involved in the planning, but is guiding the process. Therefore, the commander can properly employ his staff in the planning process.

The Marine Corps Planning Process is detailed and thorough. Each step of the process includes products to guide its planners to the next step. Based on available time, this process could take days, weeks, or months to complete. The Marine Corps prides its ability to take

strategic guidance and develop an operational plan for the tactical leader to execute. The planning process can be enhanced even further in Phase IV operations.

Phase IV operations are defined as activities conducted after decisive combat operations have ended to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations.¹³ Often Phase IV operations are not planned until significant combat operations have ceased. Instead, it is imperative that Phase IV planning begins immediately after Phase III planning has ended, otherwise the devastated infrastructure of the area will create third order effects such as economic despair, insurgent or rebel groups, and prolonged or resurgent combat operations. During this process, the interagency plays a vital role, not only in planning, but the tactical execution of those plans. The State Department is critical at this stage of a crisis operation and must be able to implement its goals immediately.

In contrast to the Marine Corps Planning Process is how the State Department conducts operational planning. Historically, diplomats believe they cannot plan due to their long-term commitment to a country and the inability to know what activities might occur or what type of leaders will be in power. This has led to a reactive rather than proactive approach that has often been the subject of military scrutiny. The State Department focuses on a strategic level of planning for the implementation of its policies, often times leaving the operational level planning as an after thought to a crisis or military operation. The State Department conducts strategic foreign policy planning and attempts to align their policies with the Department of Defense through Political-Military Policy and Planning Teams. These teams work with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands to coordinate policies on global issues.¹⁴ It assists with defense planning scenarios by providing State Department subject matter experts. These activities allow the foreign-service officer to gain a better understanding of a strategic

level military operation and helps the military leaders understand the diplomat's point of view and their ability to assist where possible.¹⁵ State Department involvement in the Political-Military Policy and Planning Teams and at the Combatant Commands is usually at the General Officer level with little input for the forward deployed civilian teams. Therefore, little thought is given to an overarching strategic plan that guides its employees on a successful operational line.

In 2010, Secretary Hillary Clinton announced the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) for the State Department titled, "Leading Through Civilian Power." The purpose of the reforms is to "harness the civilian power to advance America's interests and help make a world in which more people in more places can live in freedom, enjoy economic opportunity, and have a chance to live up to their God-given potential."¹⁶ The overall theme of the QDDR is the renewed leadership and responsibility of the State Department. Specifically, the Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Missions need to coordinate and adapt to new challenges through a strong reliance on the existing talents and skills of interagency partners to ensure the goals of foreign policies are achieved. The report focuses on State and the United States Agency for International Development as the leaders of promoting foreign policy through a whole of government approach. Secretary Clinton stresses the need for reform, which the QDDR set forth in planning and budgeting for long-term projects.

Guidance within the QDDR is rooted in strategic frameworks based upon the National Security Strategy. It calls for a top-down approach to planning with a mechanism for bottom-up feedback. The new process will create a three-tier system of planning, the Joint Strategic Plan (State Department and USAID), the Bureau and Regional Strategic Plans (offices within the departments that encompass large geographic areas), and the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (individual embassies).¹⁷ A military planner would analyze this process and see the

traditional strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning at work. This is not always the case. Often times an embassy produces strategic goals, which conflict with Washington's strategic goals. The QDDR put forth by the Secretary of State is a move in the right direction. It sets forth an infrastructure able to handle the strategic responsibilities of its department. Where it falters is at the operational level. No clear process of planning exists for which the foreign officer can rely upon. Instead employees are focused on long-term policy goals. The QDDR states that planning processes will be integrated from one functional bureau to another, but the planning process itself is not an institutional mandate. It continues to be a subjective, ad hoc, procedure, which limits the capabilities of its staff.

The Secretary has made it clear that a streamlined, integrated approach to planning must exist and the strategic goals will be in line with budget goals etc, but how do its employees plan for these goals, especially at an embassy, when no doctrinal planning process exists. Of special concern is that only a few sentences of the QDDR were devoted to the linkage between the Combatant Commands and their relationship with State/USAID. It merely refers to the need for continued cooperation in theater and country level strategies. It would be well advised that in a time of constrained budgets, the State Department examine the success of the armed services in joint operations and lead the reformation of the interagency process. The benefits of change would allow the State Department to streamline its resources and budgets to focus on National Strategic priorities.

The Interagency Process

Carl Von Clausewitz refers to war as a paradoxical trinity in which the passion of the people, the characteristics of the military commander, and the political aims of the government must work in concert together in order for victory to be obtained.¹⁸ One can apply this theory to the interagency process. If a nation is to succeed, it must coordinate the actions of the people, policy makers, and the military. By applying this theory to modern historical examples, one can gain a better understanding of the problems facing the interagency process. Even today, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates refers to the national interagency process as “a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”¹⁹ Even though the interagency has failed to work productively in some instances, it is not without its successes. A shining example of success is Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South).

JIATF-South is comprised of the 4 branches of the military, 9 different civilian agencies, and 11 partner nations.²⁰ JIATF-South had its start mainly due to the war on drugs flowing into the United States from South America. A typical interagency operation at JIATF-South can be described in the following manner, “JIATF-South receives information from the Drug Enforcement Administration of possible illicit activity. A P-3 or C-130 from the Coast Guard or Customs and Border Protection is deployed that detects and monitors a foreign flagged vessel until a Navy or Coast Guard ship with a complement of law enforcement officers can intercept. The ship is then stopped, boarded, and searched. If drugs are found, coordination through the Justice and State Departments is made with the flagged vessels state.” Although stopping a suspected ship carrying illicit drugs sounds like a simple exercise, it is a complex maneuver of

military and civilian agencies. Due to both United States law and international law, JIATF-South must properly execute its operations to ensure success.

The National Defense University conducted a study of JIATF-South through its Institute for National Strategic Studies.²¹ The university wanted to know why the interagency process appeared to work so well and how it could benefit other JIATFs and combatant commands. The researchers chose to study ten variables divided between three levels. The first level was organizational with three variables, purpose, empowerment, and support. To this end, JIATF-South realized that as a military unit, its ability to conduct law enforcement operations on drug activity was limited and its civilian partners would not participate if it were not willing to put forth the resources to combat this problem. Through a unification of effort, the task force commanders were able to provide a shared purpose that cut across the interagency boundaries.²² The second level focused on the team with four variables, structure, decision-making, culture, and learning. These variables were designed to explain the day-to-day reasons for the success of groups of individuals. The pace of activity at JTIAF-South is intense. Individual teams are structured to ensure its functionality. Decisions are usually based on consensus due to a high level of involvement by numerous government agencies. The task forces' involvement in illicit drug activity has given its members a sense of ownership. They have bought into the mission because they are able to see the results of their work. The third level focuses on the individual with three variables, composition, rewards, and leadership. These variables deal with the group's ability to take an individual and mold them into a productive team member utilizing that person's unique skill set. By maintaining this practice, groups are able to function without the constant supervision of its leader.²³

The research on JIATF-South from the National Defense University studied why it succeeds, not how. Therefore, the outcome of the study provides a framework for implementation within the interagency process. The task force, led by the United States military, has integrated civilian partners in a multi-faceted approach. The research exemplified the strategic, operational, and tactical level of organization that leads to much of its success. It provides a strategic vision, a justification of purpose, an ability to carry out its goals through proper resources, and the management to accomplish its missions. JIATF-South is unique because it has been unified from the beginning by a particular cause, the war on drugs. It is an issue often motivated by emotion and at one time fueled by near endless resources. Can this model of interagency cooperation be maintained in areas without such motivators or a lack of funding? Who should be the leader in interagency change, the United States Department of Defense or the United States Department of State?

When the Department of Defense is involved in an operation, whether it is combat related or humanitarian in nature, it often assumes the role of the overall leader. When combat operations reach Phase IV, stability and reconstruction, the State Department should and needs to take control of those efforts. The military brings an enormous amount of resources that can be a force multiplier in a unity of effort. The Secretary of State through the QDDR stresses the importance of leading through civilian power, but how does a department that has traditionally been reactive with little to no doctrinal planning, succeed in joining the players of the interagency process?

The Department of Defense has long struggled with the concept of joint operations. It was not until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 it began to codify the efforts of the armed services to achieve overarching goals. One way the act improved joint operations was to remove the

service rivalries that existed, which often hampered joint operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act removed operational control from the individual service chiefs and placed it with the combatant commanders in the field.²⁴ This ensured a centralization of leadership for training and planning of operations. Today, the combatant commands are responsible for the deployment of all armed services as well as coordination with civilian agencies in their area of operations. When a combatant command is forward deployed in combat operations, it is rightly in charge of its mission. When that operation changes to stability and reconstruction or it is involved in a strictly humanitarian effort, the United States Department of State is the legal owner of that mission within the particular country. The State Department can learn a valuable lesson from the military's concept of joint operations in order to lead the way forward in stability and reconstruction. It must bring the entire interagency to include non-governmental organizations under its umbrella for a whole of government approach in furtherance of United States foreign policy.

Financial Crisis

Recently, the United States has found itself in a fourteen trillion dollar deficit. The financial crisis will require the government to consider significant cutbacks to reduce its financial shortfall.²⁵ Usually in a time of budget cuts the Department of Defense is hit the hardest. The military will reduce the overall number of personnel in all service branches, particularly in non-essential areas. Another drastic cut would come with the decrease in replacing aging equipment. With the State Department required to reduce its spending as well, the United States' foreign policy efforts could suffer severely. However, this environment is ripe for the State Department to further its ability to lead

through civilian power. Through integrated efforts of the military and State Department, a whole of government approach can be achieved even with limited budgets. The Secretary of Defense recently released the “Defense Strategic Guidance”, which refers to how the armed services will focus its efforts in the upcoming lean fiscal years. One significant point is to maintain its ability to respond to humanitarian, disaster relief, and other crises.²⁶ The military and State Department will need to not only work together during these operations, but must streamline their processes. Through an overall coordinated effort the military can be a strong force multiplier, able to assist with security, medical services, transport, or other available resources, allowing the State Department to better focus on its mission.

Recommendations

Clearly, the State Department concentrates on its ability to formulate strategic plans, but does little to ensure a concise operational level planning process. The military, especially the Marine Corps, prides itself on a process that incorporates all levels of planning, from the strategic to the tactical. So how does the State Department and the Department of Defense improve its ability to cooperate in the interagency arena?

As previously stated, planning is the bedrock to an effective plan. Many have suggested that the National Security Council must develop a single integrated planning process at the operational level.²⁷ This would integrate planning on a level plane for all of the United States government agencies. Until this occurs, lead agencies such as the State Department are still left lagging behind. It is imperative for State to implement an operational level planning process that can be used by its personnel, especially its

embassies, to ensure its strategic goals are met. This process cannot be simply borrowed from the Marine Corps because its mission and outlook are different. However, it should utilize a similar top-down planning framework to develop a process by which all elements of national power, to include military, non-governmental agencies, and host nation capabilities are utilized. State must develop a streamlined planning process by which its strategic goals are clearly communicated to its mid level personnel for implementation. This process needs to work not only with the strategic policy planners back in Washington, D.C., but also for the Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Missions and their subordinates serving on the front lines of diplomacy at United States embassies overseas.

An area of significant concern is when combat operations end and reconstruction and stabilization efforts begin, Phase IV. It is imperative for the State Department to be involved in Phase IV planning. In fact, the State Department should be involved in military operational planning from the beginning. This would allow the State Department to see the overall concept of operations and be able to advise on how the effects of combat operations could influence stability and reconstruction efforts during Phase IV.

Currently, when planning occurs at the combatant commands, the deputy commander is involved. The deputy commander is usually a representative from the State Department who is considered the commander's political adviser. The individual holds the rank equivalent to a military flag officer. Although their input in the planning process is crucial, it is important for mid-level State personnel to be involved in the daily planning activities. This type of hands-on participation will give more legitimacy to

civilian agencies and their role in operations. It is also imperative for the eventual transition from military to civilian leadership. This will require the State Department to place additional positions within the various combatant commands and for the commands' leadership to empower those foreign service officers to actively participate in the military planning and how it effects civilian operations.

Planning for military operations occurs not just at the combatant commands, but also with operational planning teams who are in charge of developing a course of action for the units being forward deployed. State personnel must be included and assigned to these teams so the concerns and expertise of the foreign-service officer are utilized. Therefore, State personnel assigned to operational planning teams or combatant commands should possess skills and knowledge of the particular area of operations. If they do not, other personnel, even if they are not familiar with planning in the military, should be assigned to advise. This will benefit the military operation and benefit the State Department by enhancing more civilian knowledge of the military planning process and its operations. Concurrently, the combatant commands should reciprocally assign personnel to the State Department. They should be assigned to geographic areas similar to the combatant commands. Their assignments must be in offices of current relevancy and officers should receive joint credit for their career progression. Often times military officers serving in the interagency arena have not received the appropriate recognition for their duties. The military officer would be able to gain an understanding of the foreign-service officer's perspective and relate that to future missions.

Within the Marine Corps is the Marine Air Ground Task Force or MAGTF. Often during times of crisis, a MAGTF is created from existing Marine forces to be

forward deployed to handle a specific mission. It is imperative to place State Department personnel within the MAGTF, whether it is for planning or deployment purposes. The State Department employee may be a political officer who can advise on host government issues or a special agent from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The agent can lend expertise for security issues in times of social unrest during a humanitarian assistance mission or an evacuation of United States citizens. By forward deploying these types of foreign-service officers on a MAGTF, the Marine Corps can access its interagency partner to its fullest extent. Also, this will allow the use of other interagency members to be brought into the operation through direct contact with the State Department. The deployed officer can have unique insight into embassy operations as well as host country concerns that could hinder the military's mission. Through these personnel, the military can foresee problem areas and utilize State's presence to coordinate with embassies to ensure a properly executed mission. Even though additional personnel will be needed to integrate into the planning process, financial savings will be seen through the elimination of redundant or parallel efforts.

Within the Department of Defense and State Department, its managers and subordinate personnel are deeply concerned with the professional education opportunities. The military trains its officer corps at the individual service Command and Staff and War Colleges. These schools are designed to prepare an officer at the major level and above for command. The colleges concentrate on aspects of academia including, leadership, warfighting, culture and interagency operations, and operational art among others. The military offers a limited number of positions to the State Department. Agents with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security predominantly fill these positions. The State Department does not have any in house long-term

professional education schools but relies on the military and private schools for limited opportunities for attendance. The State Department needs to ensure additional positions are allocated and emphasize the importance of its employees in attending in residence professional education schools. In order to take advantage of an employee's newfound education, the department should link education assignments with relevant onward postings. For example, if a State employee attends the Marine Corps Command and Staff College for one year, the State Department should assign the individual to a combatant command or a forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit. This would allow the individual to have a better understanding of how the Department of Defense and the State Department can best serve in the interagency process.

Limitations

The United States military, government, its subordinate employees, and private civilians can be a valuable source of recommendations on how to streamline the interagency process to more effectively function on reduced budgets, but why are these agencies so slow to change? One reason is that significant change within the federal government often comes at a high cost. Historically, change meant the creation of additional agencies or adding large numbers of personnel to the payroll. Due to budgetary constraints, this is not an option. Streamlining processes and personnel will allow focus on relevant issues and countries so the military and State Department do not waste time on redundant planning and operations.

Culturally, the State Department has historically been very different from the military. Thus, its members often think that a close cooperation and relationship with the military is not needed or even useful. This attitude must change from within to allow the

interagency process to function to its full potential. For this to occur, the highest levels of management must institute the top-down planning approach, stressing the interagency process and the United States military's key role.

Another limitation to the implementation of change within the State Department concerns promotion and onward assignments. Often times, promotion is based upon how much budget and personnel management an employee has performed. This has strongly influenced personnel's choices in their career paths. State must ensure that credit is given to employees serving in non-supervisory positions. Additionally, State must focus on just rewards for its personnel serving in high-threat countries or in austere environments. It can be difficult for State to fill positions in such places. Therefore, it must look at the motivation of its staff and focus on the overall mission of the State Department to ensure its employees have a sense of ownership and responsibility to its programs and missions.

If the State Department is going to "Lead through Civilian Power", as Secretary Clinton has stated, it must embrace the concept of joint operations across the government spectrum of civilian and military agencies.²⁸ The State Department is the agency in charge of all United States non-military operations overseas. The State Department must be the leader in coordination of agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development, United States Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, and the Department of Treasury and the United States armed services.

Addressing problems instituted in the culture of an organization are difficult to change. Through strong leadership and clearly defined strategic goals as defined in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the State Department can offer its

personnel the correct way forward to lead the interagency process in the undefined financial future.

Conclusion

History has provided examples of interagency success and failure. It is now a crucial time in the history of the United States to correct the failures by learning from the successes. This will not be easy. Even with a clear path forward, the budgetary concerns of the country and the undefined battlefields of the future will place additional challenges on the United States Department of Defense and Department of State. Resources for potential operations will be in shorter supply. Through an integration of planning, the military and State Department will be able to streamline processes and prepare for crisis operations. In order to accomplish this, the State Department must first create an operational level planning process, particularly for use at United States embassies. They will be able to take the strategic goals and translate them into boots on the ground missions, capable of implementing all elements of national power. Second, the State Department and military must ensure an equal exchange of personnel. By placing personnel in key exchange billets both domestically and forward deployed, personnel can enhance the interagency process. Knowing is half the battle and if the two can learn each other's abilities and areas of concern, the United States, as a whole, will have the power to achieve the goals of its foreign policies.

Endnotes

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